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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5906

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DEPT FOR T, VCI AND EUR/PRA
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24
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JCS FOR J5/DDGSA
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR
NSC FOR LOOK
DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)
SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIV: (U) HOD MEETING ON SS-27 RVOSI, PK
SILO CONVERSIONS AND ONE-TIME DEMONSTRATION OF MM III FRONT
SECTION, JUNE 9, 2009

REF: A. STATE 057616 ANC/STR 09-411/143 (UNITED STATES
NRRC NOTIFICATION CANCELLING PK SILO
CONVERSION)
[B.](#) STATE 8779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (UNITED STATES NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)
[C.](#) RUSSIAN FEDERATION AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RUSSIAN
CONCERN REGARDING UNITED STATES
COMPLIANCE WITH CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE START TREATY DATED MARCH 10 2009

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

[11.](#) (U) This is JCIC-XXXIV-010.

[12.](#) (U) Meeting Date: June 9, 2009
Time: 10:30 - 11:45 A.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[13.](#) (S) A Heads of Delegation (HOD) Meeting was held at the Russian Mission on June 9, 2009, to discuss U.S. concerns with SS-27 RVOSI covers, the re-declaration of Peacekeeper (PK) Silo Launchers, and the conduct of a one-time demonstration of the Minuteman III (MM III) front section. All Parties were represented.

[14.](#) (S) The United States reiterated its concerns that the reentry vehicle (RV) covers used by the Russian Federation during RVOSIs were overly large and prohibited U.S.

inspectors from ascertaining that the SS-27 did not contain more than its one attributed warhead. The Russian Delegation repeated its desire to resolve this issue and stated that Russian experts were ready to meet in a working group at any time. Both Parties agreed to meet in a working group later in the day.

¶ 15. (S) Regarding the re-declaration of PK silo launchers, the Russian Delegation repeated Russia's concerns about the conversion of 50 PK silo launchers at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming to MM III silo launchers and the lack of notifications that should have been provided in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination (C or E) Protocol. The U.S. Delegation stated that a Format 143 had been sent, on June 4, 2009 (REF A), that rescinded the conversion of these silo launchers and considered the issue resolved. The

Russian Delegation agreed the issue was resolved.

¶ 16. (S) On the issue of MM III ICBM RVOSI, the U.S. Delegation stated that it had determined that the U.S. could conduct a one-time demonstration of the front section and outlined the specific procedures that would govern its conduct.

A BIG COVER SHAPED
LIKE A TEEPEE

¶ 17. (S) Taylor opened the HOD meeting, held at the Russian Mission on June 9, 2009, and reiterated U.S. concerns that

the very large covers used by the Russian Federation during SS-27 RVOSIs prohibited U.S. inspectors from ascertaining that the number of reentry vehicles present on the front section did not exceed the one warhead attributed to the SS-27. He stated that these concerns were increased by the similarities seen in the acceleration profiles between the SS-27 and the prototype RS-24 that had been flight-tested with multiple RVs. He further highlighted press accounts from inside Russia that continued to indicate plans to deploy the SS-27 with multiple warheads.

¶ 18. (S) Taylor explained that the United States believed it was the responsibility of the Russian Federation to propose solutions to this issue and that, during JCIC-XXXII, the Russian Federation had stated that it was looking for ways to address U.S. concerns. He noted that since then the United States had not heard any proposals, and reiterated that the United States remained willing to explore possible SS-27 RVOSI solutions that took into account whatever sensitive know-how had led to the use of very large covers.

¶ 19. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor and replied that this issue was an old one on the JCIC agenda and that, despite the short time left before expiration of the Treaty, the Russian Federation was interested in resolving it. He stated that, although the Treaty did not limit the size of RV covers used during an RVOSI, he understood the U.S. concerns about the covers' large size, but qualified that statement saying that the RVOSI was the most sensitive inspection and any changes to procedures required great deliberation.

I 'VE HEARD (AND MADE)
TIS ARGUMENT BEFORE

¶ 10. (S) Koshelev explained that the SS-27 was designed tested and employed with a single RV and that an SS-27 that carried multiple warheads did not exist. Analysis of the telemetry data provided to the United States would confirm this.

¶ 11. (S) Taylor responded saying that telemetry was not intended to verify the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs,

rather it provided a snapshot in time of a single flight test of single missile. It did not address capability. That was the reason for RVOSIs, to verify the numbers of warheads actually deployed.

¶12. (S) Taylor recalled discussions about Russian concerns that there were more than eight warheads on the Trident D5. One of the arguments the United States had made was that telemetry analysis confirmed only eight warheads were present, and the Russian Federation had responded with the same argument the United States was making now, that telemetry was not intended to verify numbers of warheads actually deployed.

¶13. (S) Koshelev acknowledged the irony of this discussion and quoted Dr. Ed Ifft (Begin note: Former State Representative to the START negotiations. End note.) saying, the position of both Parties were the same, they just tabled them at different times. He stated that the implementation of the Treaty's provisions was important and lamented that the Russian Federation had not been creative enough in

working to find a solution to this problem. He again stated that his experts were prepared to discuss this issue in a working group.

SO WHAT ARE YOU
DOING THIS AFTERNOON?

¶14. (S) Next, Ryzhkov relayed the differences that existed between the discussions of Trident D5 telemetry and the SS-27 and explained that the Russian Federation used the number of procedures for dispensing RVs and not acceleration profiles as the determining factor in telemetry analysis. The Russian Federation believed there were more procedures for dispensing RVs than the number of warheads attributed to the Trident. He reiterated the point that the Russian experts were ready to discuss this in a working group.

¶15. (S) Taylor asked whether there was time to schedule a working group during this session and, specifically, could it be scheduled for the same afternoon.

¶16. (S) Koshelev agreed to schedule a working group later in the day so the experts could discuss the issue further.

THE PRODIGAL SILOS RETURN

¶17. (S) Koshelev opened the discussion of the re-declaration of PK silo launchers, citing the Format 3 notification sent by the United States in August 2008 declaring the 50 PK ICBMs at F.E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, to be MM III ICBMs (REF B). The Russian Federation was concerned that, despite claiming these silo launchers had been converted to MM III, not all required notifications had been sent in accordance with the C or E Protocol. Additionally, during an RVOSI in September 2008, Russian inspectors were unable to confirm that any conversion had taken place.

¶18. (S) Koshelev acknowledged that, during the current session of the JCIC, the United States had provided a copy of the START Format 143 notification that was transmitted on June 4, 2009 that rescinded the Format 3 from August 2008 (REF A).

¶19. (S) Taylor verified that the START Format 143 had been sent rescinding the Format 3 and that the United States would provide the appropriate information in the next six-month update to the Memorandum of Understanding. He further stated that the United States regretted any confusion caused by this issue and considered the matter closed.

¶20. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for his explanation and

acknowledged that technical mishaps occurred in even the most advanced bureaucratic systems. The Russian Federation understood the U.S. position and also considered the matter resolved.

HOW LONG HAVE WE BEEN
TALKING ABOUT THIS?

¶21. (S) Koshelev opened the MM III RVOSI discussion and opined that no other issue had been under consideration so long without a solution. However, in light of discussions at JCIC-XXXII and JCIC-XXXIII, Russia believed that the United States was ready to provide its plan for conducting a demonstration of the MM III front section.

¶22. (S) Koshelev stated that, in prior sessions, Russia had stated its concerns with the MM III RVOSI, that those concerns formed the basis of a plan for conducting a demonstration, and that he wanted to reaffirm the Russian position regarding a possible demonstration.

¶23. (S) Koshelev confirmed that Russia was ready to participate in a one-time demonstration of the MM III front section that would confirm that the space in the lower portion of the front section could not contain objects of similar dimensions to a reentry vehicle. He acknowledged that any procedures used in such a demonstration would not lead to new procedures in future RVOSIs, adding that without such a demonstration Russian concerns could not be resolved.

DETAILS OF THE DEMONSTRATION

¶24. (S) Taylor stated that the United States had decided to conduct a one-time demonstration of the MM III front section that would take place outside of treaty inspection quotas, and that the United States would inform the other Parties of the date through diplomatic channels.

¶25. (S) Taylor explained that the procedures used to conduct the demonstration would mimic procedures listed in Annex 3 of the Inspection Protocol. Specifically, after separation from the ICBM, the front section would be transported to a specially allocated site where inspectors would be permitted to view the space inside the lower portion of the front section to determine that it could not contain items corresponding to reentry vehicles.

¶26. (S) Taylor further explained that sensitive elements might be shrouded, but would not impede the observers' ability to determine that additional reentry vehicles could not be located within that space. Finally, he stressed that no additional devices or equipment would be used during the one-time demonstration, and that the demonstration would not lead to new procedures for use in MM III RVOSIs.

¶27. (S) Taylor stated that the United States would expect a factual report to be prepared that documented the conduct of the demonstration, and included procedures used and what inspectors observed. He further explained that the United States expected that a satisfactory demonstration would allow the Parties to resolve this issue, that the result would be recorded in coordinated statements, and that this issue would be removed from the JCIC agenda.

¶28. (S) Taylor provided the following points to explain the modalities of the demonstration.

Begin Points:

-- The United States would select the ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs at which the demonstration would be

conducted.

-- The observers would designate the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the MM III front section for the demonstration.

-- The procedures set forth in Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol would be followed up to the point of front section separation. The procedures set forth in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to the Inspection Protocol would be used to view a silo launcher declared not to contain a MM III ICBM should that be encountered.

End Points.

¶29. (S) Koshelev thanked Taylor for the business-like approach and asked that the United States provide the proposal in writing so the Russian experts could study it and respond appropriately. He also asked Taylor whether this demonstration would be open to all Treaty Partners. Koshelev asked that the details of the demonstration be provided in written form. Taylor agreed.

¶30. (S) Taylor confirmed that it would be up to the other Parties to determine the make-up of the observer team and explained that the United States would provide the proposal in a written response to the Russian Aide-Memoire of March 10, 2009 (REF C).

¶31. (U) Documents exchanged. None.

¶32. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. Couch
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. Johnston
Lt Lobner
Mr. Smith
Mr. Stein
Mr. Vogel
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ugorich
Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Mr. Nurgozhayev

RUSSIA

Mr. Koshelev
Mr. Bolotov
Ms. Ivanova
Mr. Kashirin

Ms. Kotkova
Mr. Petrov
Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Serov
Mr. Shevtchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Mr. Vorontsov
Col Zaytsev
Mr. Dashko (Int)
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Mr. Nykonenko
Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Chernyavskiy
MGen Fedotov
Mr. Shevchenko

¶33. (U) Taylor sends.
STORELLA